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Sinkler: Public Corporations

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
HUGER SINKLER*

Annexation Problems
In the case of Harley v. City of Spartanburg' the problems
disposed of by the Court arose in a contest relating to the
validity of an annexation proceeding undertaken by the city
of Spartanburg. The questions disposed of by the Court all
concern the sufficiency of the petition of the freeholders of
the annexed area. Unlike certain other states, notably Virginia and Texas, which permit incorporated municipalities
of certain classes to extend themselves, and to incorporate into
their corporate limits adjacent territory, the statute of South
Carolina imposes many conditions upon annexation. Perhaps
the most onerous condition is that set forth in Section 47-12
which requires, as a condition precedent to the election called
for by the statute, the presentation of a petition signed by
a majority of the freeholders of the territory to be annexed.
The burden of securing the actual signatories to such a petition is obvious. Other difficulties not apparent in the statute
also exist, because very seldom are the tax books of a county
set up in such fashion as to reflect actual land holdings in
any given area of relatively small size. Furthermore, the
statute offers no specific definition of the term "freeholder."
All of these problems were present in this case and it was
doubtless with this in mind that the Court observed: "We desire to say that even if our calculations had shown that the
petition was a little short of the required number, we would
hesitate under the circumstances of this case to set aside the
finding of the City Council [that the petition did in fact contain the signatures of a majority of the freeholders] which
is prima facie correct. The possibility of a slight mistake on
our part is too great. Probably no two persons would reach
the identical result; as pointed out in the Rawl case mathe*B.A., College of Charleston; Legal Education, University of South
Carolina, School of Law; member City Council of Charleston, 1939-43;
member State Legislature, 1932-36 and 1945-46; member of Charleston
County, South Carolina, and American Bar Associations. Member of
firm of Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. 230 S.C. 525, 96 S.E. 2d 828 (1957).

100

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1

SURVEY
OFCarolina
SOUTHLaw
CAROLINA
LAW
South
Review, Vol.
10, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 16

matical precision is improbable if not impossible in a case of
this kind."
Among the more interesting dispositions made by the
Court was its holding that persons who were vendees under
an executory contract of sale could not be considered freeholders under this particular statute. The Court noted that
such a vendee, even though he had made a down payment,
had only an equitable interest in the land.
A practitioner interested in the problems resulting from
annexation proceedings should also refer to the earlier case
of Truesdale v. Jones2 in which the Court sets forth a synopsis of the steps which the statute requires to be taken in
annexation proceedings.
Irregularitiesin Annexation Election
In the case of Rutland v. City of Spartanburg3 here again
is a contest resulting from an annexation proceeding relating to the city of Spartanburg. The questions here related
to the manner in which the annexation election was conducted. It was among other things contended that an earlier
election which involved substantially the same territory, had
resulted unfavorably and that the election here, held a mere
two months later, was untimely. The Court noted that there
was no statute limiting the number of annexation elections
which might be held in any area, or prescribing that any
given period of time must elapse between two such elections.
On that basis the Court sustained the holding of the election,
although it observed that there was no allegation that the
time lapse since the earlier election was unreasonable. Since
it also fortified its conclusion on this point by the observation that the area involved in the challenged election varied
somewhat from that involved in the earlier election, there
seems to be left open the possibility that a succession of
elections might meet with judicial disapproval.
It seems to the writer that the question here is one solely
for Legislative consideration. Certainly a legislative provision requiring a reasonable spacing of elections would be
in order.
Another question disposed of in the case concerned the
failure to number the ballots in the manner required for
2. 224 S. C. 237, 78 S. E. 2d 274 (1953).

3. 230 S. C.255, 95 S. E. 2d 443 (1956).
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ballots used in general elections. However, the Court correctly notes that the provisions of Section 23-309 (2) of the
1952 Code relates entirely to the form of ballots used in general elections. There are no comparable provisions in the Code
relating to the numbering of ballots used in other elections.
Other questions involved in the case were disposed of by
a restatement of the time-honored rule that an election will
not be declared invalid because of errors or irregularities
that do not affect the result of the election or bring it into
doubt.
Power of Municipal Corporationsto Sell Public Property
Bobo v. City of Spartanburg4 . In an effort to improve
traffic conditions within the shopping area of Spartanburg,
the city agreed with a private corporation to convey a portion
of the public area known as Morgan Square in exchange for
certain real estate owned by the private corporation. The
agreement defining the terms of the transaction provided
that the legality of the city's undertaking should be adjudicated and the suit here sought judgment determining the
city's right to effect conveyance of a portion of the public
area. Noting that in South Carolina there is no distinction
between governmental and so-called private functions of incorporated municipalities, and that municipally-owned property is deemed held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of
all citizens of the municipality, the Court resolved the question by finding explicit statutory authorization for the conveyance. The statute referred to empowers cities to sell and
convey all property at will. On this basis the Court refused
to consider the propriety of the transaction, noting that since
the power had been given by the Legislature to the city, it
was not within the province of the Court to inquire into the
advisability of the city's action. The Court supported this
position with earlier cases which indicate that in the absence
of fraud or abuse of authority, the actions of governmental
bodies of incorporated municipalities are not open to question.
One basis for the result rests upon the statement that the
deed under which the city acquired the property contained
no dedication of the area in question to a specific public purpose, or other restrictive provision as to user. Had such
4. 230 S. C. 396, 96 S. E. 2d 67 (1956).
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existed, presumably the city would be required to observe the
conditions of the deed.
Right to Repeal Ordinances
In the case of Wright v. City of Florencee, the City Council
of Florence, on July 1st, 1950, under the recited authority of
the statute now codified as Section 47-21, adopted an ordinance establishing a Civil Service Commission with jurisdiction over the police and fire departments of the City of
Florence. On December 8th, 1955, a succeeding Council repealed the ordinance of July 1st, 1950, and its action in so
doing was challenged on the ground that it did not have the
statutory right to repeal the earlier ordinance.
The Court reviewed the statute and found that the authorization to adopt the ordinance contained no provision prohibiting its repeal and consequently reached the conclusion
that the express power to adopt was coupled with the implied
power to repeal unless the repeal impaired the validity of
a contract in pursuance of the ordinance or resulted in a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court's decision is clearly in accordance with the general rule, and it is an established principle that a legislative
body cannot, through the device of an irrevocable ordinance
or statute, bind its successors.
Also involved in the appeal was the contention of the Chief
of Police that the repeal of the earlier ordinance unconstitutionally impaired his contractual rights to his position. While
the Court did not pass upon this question, because of the fact
that it had not been specifically passed upon by the Court below, which had denied the right of the City Council to repeal
the ordinance of 1950, the Court did observe that in the absence of a constitutional or statutory restriction, a municipal
corporation which was given the power to create an office
might abolish that office, and that tenure of office statutes
and Civil Service statutes do not prevent a bona fide abolition
of the office by the municipality. The right to hold public office is not a constitutional right and the appointment to office
created by statute is generally subject to the condition that
the office may be abolished.
5. 229 S. C. 419, 93 S. E. 2d 215 (1956).
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Validity of Curfew Ordinance
The case of Painter v. Town of Forest Acres involves the
interesting question as to whether the town of Forest Acres
was empowered to adopt a curfew ordinance. The challenged
ordinance provides that it is unlawful to operate a place of
business or keep open for the purpose of operating any business of any kind anywhere within the town of Forest Acres
during the hours between midnight and six o'clock in the
morning.
The respondent in the case challenged the validity of the
ordinance on the ground that the ordinance was an invalid
exercise of police powers and that it was unconstitutional
and violative of respondent's rights under the due process
sections of the State Constitution. The facts of the case
established that the respondent's place of business was a
drive-in restaurant of long standing. The Master and the
Court below found that the ordinance unjustly deprived the
respondent of her right to operate a business. The Supreme
Court sustained this conclusion and held that a municipal
corporation could not make a business a nuisance by merely
declaring it to be such, that property consists not only in
ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of
use, enjoyment and disposal. It held that anything which
destroyed one or more of the elements of property to that
extent destroyed the property itself. The Court stated that
the enforcement of an ordinance to require all businesses to
close at midnight would seriously impair if not destroy many
lawful businesses and was so unreasonable as to violate the
owner's constitutional privileges. The Court noted that this
particular ordinance seemed to be directed at the respondent
with the specific purpose in mind of closing her place of business. The conclusion of the Court in this case is not open to
challenge. However, it should be observed that municipalities
do have power to regulate the operation of businesses and, as
a general rule, when a municipality duly clothed with such
power prescribes that which constitutes a nuisance, its decision will be upheld. Furthermore, there is a general presumption to the effect that the action taken by a municipality
in declaring the operation of businesses to be nuisances are
valid, and while one has no quarrel with the results of this
particular case, it should not be regarded precedent for the
6. 231 S. C. 56, 97 S. E. 2d 71 (1957).
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proposition that businesses operated within municipalities are
not subject to proper regulations. All forms of government
involve a partial surrender of basic rights. This is particularly true in the case of municipal government where
people who live in close proximity find it necessary to surrender rights in order to enjoy the privileges and protection
afforded by municipal government. While the courts do have
the power to strike down regulatory ordinances where unreasonable, this is a power which should be carefully and
cautiously exercised.
Zoning
The case of Stevenson v. Board of Adjustment7 involved a
neighborhood contest between a group of residents of a section of Old Historic Charleston and The First Baptist Church
of that city, over the right of the church to extend its Sunday School Building, which was used both for religious purposes and for a private day school which the church had been
operating without a permit. The aggrieved property owners
had contended that the extended buildings increased lot occupancy beyond that permitted by the Charleston Zoning
Ordinance. They likewise contended that even if it were
within the discretionary power of the Board of Adjustment
to grant the permit, its action in so doing in this case constituted an abuse of discretion. The property owners further
challenged the right of the church to operate a day school in
the building.
The Supreme Court noted the first questions presented to
it for decision as follows:
Should under the facts and circumstances of this
case, The First Baptist Church of Charleston be per-

mitted to extend its Sunday school plant to an extent
beyond that permitted by the Zoning Ordinance of the
City of Charleston?
Is the decision below granting permission to The First
Baptist Church of Charleston to operate a day school in
its Sunday school plant to be upheld?
Both questions had been resolved favorably to the church
by Charleston's Board of Adjustment, and had been sustained
by the Court of Common Pleas on appeal from the Board's
decision.
7. 230 S. C. 440, 96 S. E. 2d 456 (1957).
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The final question in the case related to a limitation upon
the use of the enlarged plant which had been imposed by the
Board of Adjustment which had held:
Because of the absence of any recreational ground on
the premises, congestion of the grounds with existing
buildings, and the new proposed building, as well as tomb
stones and all of the other facts adduced in testimony
in the aforementioned hearing, it is directed that the
maximum number of day students permitted to occupy
the premises not exceed 270.
This limitation upon the use of the building had been
stricken by the Court of Common Pleas on the ground that
it was harsh and unreasonable.
The decision of the Supreme Court sustained the Board of
Adjustment in all respects.
First of all, the Court noted that there were two lot occupancy provisions involved. The first prohibited lot occupancy beyond thirty-five percent of the lot. Variances beyond
this limitation were admittedly within the Board of Adjustment's discretion. The second was a flat prohibition against
lot occupancy beyond fifty percent.

The facts of the case showed that the extended buildings
brought the lot occupancy to something just less than fifty
percent, but, if as contended by the neighborhood, graves,
grave stones and other monuments were brought into consideration in determining lot occupancy, that in such event
the lot occupancy would extend beyond fifty percent.
The Court concluded that the Board of Adjustment was
justified in granting a variance from the thirty-five percent
limitation on the ground that a strict application of the
Zoning Ordinance would result in the church suffering singular disadvantage. It further concluded that graves, grave
stones and other similar monuments were not buildings
within the meaning of the Zoning Ordinance and need not be
taken into consideration in determining lot occupancy.
The Court also concluded that the Board was justified by
the terms of the Ordinance in granting to the church the
right to use the premises for a day school. In doing so it
noted that schools were permitted uses under the Ordinance
which, in the discretion of the Board, might be allowed.
Finally, the Court reversed the Court of Common Pleas
and reinstated the condition as to occupancy imposed by the
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local Board. It reviewed the evidence and findings of the
Board and noted the crowded condition under which the
school was occupied, and held that the Board was fairly
justified in imposing the limitation noted above. In so doing
it cited with approval the statement of the text in 58 American Jurisprudence which declares that the rule of law permits the imposition of reasonable conditions upon the granting of an exception to or variance of a zoning restriction as
to a particular piece of property. The conditions under which
such limitations may be imposed must relate to the land itself and to the use thereof, and cannot be imposed as against
any particular person.
The case here involves no unusual question of zoning law.
The opinion is clear and well written.
Consequences of Merger
The case of City of Columbia v. Sanders" arose in the attempt to settle a vexatious problem arising from the merger
of the municipalities of Columbia and Eau Claire which took
effect as of December 2nd, 1955. The specific problem facing
the growing city of Columbia related to its right to issue
further waterworks and sewer system revenue bonds.
In 1949 the city of Columbia issued $2,000,000 of waterworks and sewer system revenue bonds. In the proceedings
authorizing these bonds, the City reserved the right to issue,
from time to time thereafter, subject to certain stated conditions, additional revenue bonds on a parity with those then
being issued. Columbia had availed itself of this parity provision on two occasions. In 1953 another $2,000,000 of bonds
were issued and again in 1954 $1,500,000 of bonds had been
issued. All of the outstanding bonds of these issues are of
equal rank and on a parity among themselves. At the time
of its annexation Eau Claire had four issues of bonds, payable
from the revenues of its waterworks and sewer system. In
none of the proceedings authorizing the issuance of the Eau
Claire bonds were there provisions made to permit the issuance of further bonds on a parity with those then being
issued. The result was that the Eau Claire bonds ranked
in the order of their issuance and constituted respectively,
first, second, third and fourth liens upon the revenues of its
system. In the proceedings relating to the merger or con8. 231 S. C. 61, 97 S. E. 2d 210 (1957).
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solidation of Eau Claire with Columbia, it was provided that
all property of Eau Claire should become the property of the
enlarged city of Columbia, and that the city of Columbia
should assume all bonded indebtedness of Eau Claire as well
as all other outstanding obligations. It was also provided in
the merger agreement that identical water rates should prevail throughout the consolidated city, it being provided that
the rate should be sufficient to meet all present and future
revenue bond covenants existing in both Eau Claire and
Columbia.
Notwithstanding the provisions in the merger agreement,
the City Council of Columbia, in adopting the resolution declaring that Eau Claire had been annexed to and had become
a part of Columbia, provided that the waterworks and sewer
system of Eau Claire should be operated and maintained as
a separate system for so long a time as any of its revenue
bonds should remain outstanding, but that upon payment of
all of said bonds the system should be combined and merged
into the waterworks and sewer system of the city of Columbia
as part and parcel thereof.
Finding itself required to extend its waterworks and sewer
system, the city of Columbia contemplated the issuance of
further bonds payable from the revenues of that system, and
it sought in this declaratory judgment suit a determination
of whether there had been, in fact, a merger of the two utility
systems. The Court below had held that the merger of the
municipalities had been accomplished without the merger of
the two utility systems, and that the right of the city of Columbia to issue revenue bonds on a parity with the bonds of
its three outstanding issues had not been changed or affected
in any way whatsoever.
The Supreme Court did not agree with the results reached
below. It noted that the law was well settled that upon consolidation of two municipal corporations the enlarged corporation, in the absence of contrary legislative provision, or
agreement, takes all of the property of the combining constituents, and that the contracts and indebtedness of the
corporations which are consolidated or annexed become the
contracts and indebtedness of the consolidated corporation.
It notes that the identity of the component elements is lost
and becomes absorbed into the new creation. The Court con-
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cluded that on the facts of this case not only was there no
agreement preventing the application of the general rule but
that the terms of the merger agreement specifically contemplated the assumption of all obligations by Columbia and
specifically a merger of the two utility systems.
The Court held:
There has been a merger of the two utility systems.
In the further issuance of revenue bonds by the City of
Columbia, there must be taken into consideration the
debt service requirements of the Eau Claire bonds, and
the earnings test must be applied to the consolidated
system.
The case is obviously one of limited application and the
important point to be noted is the statement of general law
relating to the effect of merging two municipal corporations.
Equally important to note are the provisions of Section 47-13
of the Code which permit the two merging units to provide
by contract the effect of merger upon the component parts
to the merger. In this particular case, the provisions of the
merger contract relating to identical water rates justify the
Court's conclusion that there had been an attempt to merge
the two utility systems. The result, of course, makes it difficult for Columbia to spell out to its new bondholders their
precise rights. Since the earnings test relating to the issuance
of the additional bonds requires that the debt service of the
Eau Claire bonds be taken into account, it is clear that the
Eau Claire bondholders have rights with respect to the revenues of the combined system, notwithstanding their obvious
rights to claim the revenues of the system serving the territory that formerly constituted Eau Claire.
The Court in its decision expressed doubt as to the propriety of a declaratory judgment to determine the City's
rights under the merger agreement. It stated:
We have been in considerable doubt as to whether
the pleadings present a proper case for any kind of
declaratory relief. But since the rule requiring the
existence of a justifiable controversy in a declaratory
judgment suit is somewhat relaxed where the public
interest is involved, we have decided to make the foregoing limited declaration with respect to the further
issuance of further revenue bonds.
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This statement is somewhat surprising in view of the fact
that the Supreme Court of South Carolina, like the courts of
last resort of other states, have always been willing to assist
public corporations in resolving questions which relate to
public financing. The reason for this is obvious. Because of
their character, municipal bonds have an accepted market
but only when there is no question whatsoever with respect to
their legality. Those expressing opinions upon the validity
of municipal bonds, unlike the lawyer examining a real estate
title, may not discuss the law and give an opinion leaving it
to the client to weigh any risk attached to the transaction and
decide for himself. The lawyer rendering an opinion upon
municipal obligations is required to express himself in categoric and unqualified fashion. In effect his opinion states
that there is no reasonable question that could possibly exist
with respect to the validity of the bonds being issued. As a
consequence, if any question exists which could be resolved
against the validity of the bonds, it is his duty to refrain
from approving the bonds in the absence of a clarifying decision by the appropriate Appellate Court of last resort.
Prior to the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act
suits of this sort were brought in equity seeking to enjoin
the municipal officers from issuing bonds on the ground that
they would be illegal or unconstitutional. The Declaratory
Judgment Act seems tailored to the letter to fit this type
of law suit. And it is for that reason that this comment is
being made. Of course, the Court is right in stating that the
Declaratory Judgment Act does not require the Court to
give advisory opinions. But such was not the case here.
The City of Columbia was faced with the necessity of issuing
a substantial amount of revenue bonds. If it did not know
the effect of the merger between itself and Eau Claire, it
could give no assurance to those who might buy its bonds
as to the rights that they had to the revenues of the utility
system. Thus, the City of Columbia was not seeking an advisory opinion but merely a declaration of its legal rights
as to a course of procedure which it had to institute forthwith.
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Measure of Damagesin Municipal Condemnationfor
Street Purposes
By a 3 to 2 decision, the Court, in the case of Smith v. City
of Greenville9 decided that special benefits derived by a
property holder whose land was taken for street purposes
might be offset against damages resulting, including those
directly attributable to the taking of the land itself.
The dissenting Justices concluded that special benefits
might be offset only against the damages to the residue of
the land and not against the value of the actual land taken
for street purposes.
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Legge made an
obviously exhaustive research of the problem. He noted that
until the adoption of the Constitution of 1868 an individual
had no right, against the State's power of eminent domain,
to compensation for the taking of his land for a public highway. He also noted the two mandates of Section 17 of Article
I of the present State Constitution. The pertinent provision
declares that "private property shall not be taken for private
use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use

without just compensation being first made therefor."
In comparing this provision with the text of Paragraph
20 of Article IX, which relates to the acquisition of rightsof-way by private companies, Judge Legge noted the inclusion in Paragraph 20 of the provision requiring corporations to pay full compensation for any taking, "irrespective
of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation." Largely on the basis of this comparison the majority held that special benefits should be taken into account
against the value of the land taken.
The dissenting Judges did not dispute the logic of Judge
Legge's analysis of the constitutional provisions, but based
their dissent upon their construction of the statute, after first
noting that a statute relating to compensation might be more
generous than a constitutional provision requiring compensation for property taken for public use.
The statute involved requires payment for the actual value
of the land taken and for special damages resulting therefrom, but states that due allowance shall be made for any
special benefit which might accrue to the owner. On the basis
9. 229 S. C. 252, 92 S. E. 2d 639 (1956).
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of this language the majority result seems correct, for surely
with the text of the language of Section 20 of Article IX before it, the General Assembly would have used precise language had it wished a land owner to be compensated for the
value of the land taken "irrespective of any benefit from any
improvement proposed."
In the case of Heath Springs Light & Power Co. v. Lynch's
River Elec. Corp.10 the private corporate utility contested the
right of the Cooperative to serve customers in the territory
as to which it asserted an exclusive right of franchise. The
private utility held a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity issued to it by the Public Service Commission of South
Carolina, which was asserted to be an exclusive right of
franchise as to the disputed area.
Notwithstanding this assertion, the Court concluded that
the statute under which the electric Cooperative was organized permitted it to sell in the service area allotted to the
private utility. The decision rests upon the statutory scope of
the power granted to the electric Cooperative but it reviews
earlier cases which are historical landmarks of the early days
of the so-called New Deal era. This review established overwhelming Court support for the proposition that competition from a public agency with a private utility constitutes
damnum absque injurict, notwithstanding that competition
might injure or even destroy the private utility.
Since some of the litigation discussed in the opinion reached
the highest courts of the land, it is no longer doubtful that
private utilities must look solely to the Legislature for protection against undue public competition.
The view taken by courts dealing with public ventures
into fields which are regarded by many as the peculiar domain of private enterprise, swings back and forth with the
pendulum of economic conditions. In the early case of Copes
v. Richardsonn when the pre-Civil War effort of the City
of Charleston to build a network of railroads to its port was
undertaken, the Court somewhat naively observed that "a
[municipal] corporation is an artificial person capable not
only of exercising given powers but also of owning real and
personal property." On this basis the Court concluded that
10. 231 S. C. 34, 97 S. E. 2d 79 (1957).
11. 10 Rich. Law 491 (1857)'.
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the only question legitimate and proper to its inquiry was
whether the plan was suitable to "the welfare or conveniency
of the City." The Court held that question was one for the
City Council. Compare this attitude with that existing in the
post-Civil War days when many of the earlier undertakings
of municipal corporations had brought grief to their taxpayers. In the case of Feldman v. City Council af Charleston 12 (1884), the Court had before it the validity of a bond
issue by the City of Charleston whose proceeds had been
loaned to individuals to enable them to rebuild that portion
of Charleston which had been destroyed by the great fire of
1863. The bonds had been issued and were outstanding in the
hands of the public and the Plaintiff had sought to establish
liability of the City upon the coupons representing interest
due. Notwithstanding all of this, the Court concluded that
the undertakings of the City were beyond its constitutional
powers and held that since the purpose for which the bonds
were issued was not essentially a public purpose, the bonds
were invalid.
No moral is attempted; merely the observation that economic conditions existing at any given time have a marked
effect on litigation relating to the nature and extent of the
powers of public corporations.

12. 23 S. C. 57 (1884).
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